The Future of Convergence & Regulation:
Trends -- and Errors! -- from the US and EU
By Kenneth Neil Cukier
Business Correspondent, The Economist
Keidanren Kaikan Convergence Regulatory Symposium
February 26, 2008 - Tokyo, Japan
Introduction
Good afternoon. It is an honour to speak to you today. I recently moved to Japan, eight months ago, and very much appreciate the warm hospitality that I have received. But it means that I have only limited experience with Japan. Yet as someone who has lived and worked in America and Europe, I can speak about how media convergence and regulation is taking shape in both places.
My remarks will look specifically at mistakes that American and European companies have made, and errors in the EU and US regulatory policies. I realize that things are done very differently in Japan. But the experiences of the West might be useful. I would be happy if I can help Japan to learn from the mistakes in America and Europe.
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A Story
I would like to begin with a
story that is relevant to consider when thinking about convergence and
regulation.
In the early 1990s, AT&T
laid down cables across the United States to build a nationwide network. After
digging the trenches, they wanted to seal it securely. So they poured cement
over the trenches. Then -- of course -- something happened: the Internet.
Between 1994 and 1998, AT&T sold as much telecoms capacity as it expected
to sell in almost 20 years, for an era when voice calls were the main reason
people used telecoms. Now demand for capacity was huge. And bandwidth
technology didnÕt stay the same, as it generally did in the world of voice
calls. Instead, it improved greatly during this period.
However, when AT&T wanted
upgrade the cables with faster technology, it realized it had a very serious
problem. The cost of cracking through the cement to reach the cables was
enormous. AT&T had made a huge error. The company hadnÕt build their network
in a way that made it ÒextensibleÓ or Òupgradeable.Ó In some ways, it was an
understandable mistake. The company did not know at the outset how the
technology would evolve. Ultimately, AT&T had to spend a huge amount of
money upgrading its lines -- something that contributed to its demise when it
was sold in 2005 for a small sum, $16 billion, to one of the ÒBaby BellsÓ
(which in recent years adopted the famous name).
The story is important not
only because of its lessons for the technology and telecoms industry, but
because of what it means for policy makers. Regulations are often like this: it
pours concrete on an industry. It hardens the economic structure into place.
And like AT&TÕs cement, the regulations are hard to undo once they have
been set.
In some ways this is
understandable, as well: it is impossible to know at the start how things will
evolve. To apply this idea, it would suggest that the solution is to design
regulations that are flexible or Òupgradeable,Ó that presume from the outset
that the regulatory environment will change, because the technology and usage
themselves will certainly change -- and in ways we cannot predict.
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Overview
This story serves as a basis for my remarks today. Although we cannot know how
things will evolve, as business leaders, policy makers, academics, economists
-- and yes, even journalists -- we are forced to place our bets on the
direction things may go. To lend my voice to the cacophony, my remarks will
cover three themes.
First, I will note the errors
that some American and European companies have made in their failure to accept
convergence and a new regulatory environment, in two areas: telecoms and
newspapers.
Second, I will briefly look
at three technology trends -- blogs, mobile television and ÒWeb 2.0.Ó Together,
they highlight the underlying characteristics of media convergence: the way it
allows for open, self-organizing collaboration among individuals and groups.
This radically changes how businesses form and interact. It represents both a challenge
and an opportunity for established players.
Third, I will examine two
regulatory issues, and note the mistakes that were encountered, in part because
of a failure to appreciate these technology trends. The first is the European
UnionÕs ÒAudiovisual Media Services DirectiveÓ -- also known by its earlier
name, ÒTelevision Without Frontiers.Ó The second is proposed legislation in the
US on network neutrality.
My remarks will conclude by
explaining why getting convergence and regulation right is so important,
because of what lies over the horizon, namely, ubiquitous networking for
machines, objects, appliances, bodies, and so on.
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I. Errors in Business
In America and Europe, many
companies have faced difficulties due to the Internet while others have
prospered. Often what distinguishes the winners from the losers is the degree
to which they have embraced rather than resisted convergence, and accepted or
rejected new regulatory structures.
The media and telecoms
companies in the West found that there is a heavy price to trying to protect
the status quo, even though it seems more comfortable than the uncertainty of
finding new business models. Consider two cases:
1. Telecoms
Over the past decade, the
telecoms industry faced new technologies and new uses -- from Internet usage,
to Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) and mobile calls -- that threatened its
business. Of these changes, Internet calling was clearly the most disruptive.
This should have been obvious to operators: between 1965 and 1980, the average
revenue per call minute fell from slightly over $1.50 to slightly below 50
cents, according to AmericaÕs Federal Communications Commission (FCC). That was
due to deregulation, and the revenue stayed steady for almost a decade. The Internet
served the final blow: from 1995 to 2005 average revenue per minute fell from
around 45 cents to below 5 cents.
Still, by 2006 many operators
remained very dependent on voice service. Verizon got almost 80% of its revenue
for voice, and AT&T derived over 60%. In Europe, incumbent operators such
as Deutsche Telekom, KPN and France Telecoms received around 60% of their
revenue from voice. The result is that their share price -- an indication of
business performance -- have shed around 50% of their value since 1999. In
America, long-distance operators like MCI and Sprint basically atrophied and
were acquired -- with only their Internet backbone or wireless unit of any
value. This set of affairs is particularly damning when one considers that
spending on communications was one of the big areas of growth among consumer
categories since 1990 (up almost 30%), according to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
But instead of seeing
Internet calling as an opportunity to forge a new commercial relationship with
customers, operators considered it a threat -- and rushed to regulators for
protection. They wanted to collect fees when smaller telecoms firms connected
to their network with modems for Internet traffic. They sought to apply
restrictions on Internet calls. They sought to have regulatory requirements
placed upon the start-ups to thwart them, such as forcing them to make their
systems open to wiretapping or emergency service calls. Regulators largely
resisted this.
All the time they spent
trying to stop Internet calling was not spent on competing. The Internet
communications firm Skype launched in August 2003 and by December 2005 it had
over 50 million subscribers. Today we know that voice over Internet Protocol
(VOIP) is not just about cheap calls, but about new forms of real-time
collaboration with voice, images, documents and the like. What American and
European telecoms operators found out was that to resist change is to risk
being devoured by it. The entire business had changed but the companies did
not.
2. Newspapers
The same is true for media
companies in Europe and America. Newspapers are struggling. In America, many
large newspaper groups have been sold, as their business has begun to erode. In
2006 McClatchy purchased Knight Ridder, a major chain of daily newspapers, in
2007 the billionaire investor Sam Zell bought the Tribune Company (home of the Chicago
Tribune and Los Angeles Times) and Rupert Murdoch of News Corp acquired Dow Jones,
which publishes the Wall Street Journal. In Europe, newspapers are also struggling. BritainÕs tabloids have
taken to inserting a free DVD in certain issues as a way to boost sales -- and
have launched free editions to gain readers and attract advertisers. In France,
three main dailies, Liberation, Le Monde and Les Echos are all on the blocks
for new owners.
Strikingly, the newspapers
industry has been timid in adapting to the Web and experimenting with new
business models. The Internet would offer them a global audience and a chance
for targeted advertising. But they resisted change. One sign of their
resistance is their early disparagement of ÒblogsÓ -- the musing of ordinary
people seemed to be drivel. But after a series of scandals in which blogs
revealed inaccuracies in the media, and as some of the brightest minds in
academia and professional life now blog, they have lost that stigma. Indeed,
many newspapers now publish web blogs, from the New York Times to the Wall Street Journal.
But still the resistance to
the Internet remains. A more powerful sign of newspaper groupÕs unease to new
models was the reaction to Google News, which aggregates content and provided
links. Many people used it as their news page, bypassing the newspaper sites.
Their trade associations forced Google to stop the activity, that increased
their brand awareness and drove traffic to their website. A Belgian newspaper
association and the French wire agency AFP actually sued Google to stop the
practice.
Today, the dispute is
resolved with archived stories being available online -- for sale. So one can
purchase a program on AmericaÕs National Public Radio (NPR) from August 1995
that quoted the economist Thomas Hazlitt (who is a member of the KeidanrenÕs
convergence and regulatory working group) for $3.95. An article from the
Washington Times from 1994 is 2.95. That is still too expensive for most
people, considering so much is available online for free. The papers apparently
donÕt see that there is more to be gained by earning revenue in ancillary ways,
such as targeted advertising or affiliate referral fees, than simple sales.
In this context, it should be
unsurprising that soon after Mr Murdoch acquired the Wall Street Journal he suggested making the content freely available --
and around the same time, the New York Times made free its paid-for content sections. What the
papers began to understand was that new media sites that are only a few years
old, like Digg.com and some blogs, get more traffic per day than major
newspapers sites. They have to change their business models.
In America, newspaper groups
benefit from regulation in many ways, particularly in regards to television and
radio broadcasting licenses. In 2007 they successfully lobbied the FCC to
increase the media ownership caps slightly. The justification was that the
Internet increases the pool of information available to the public. But to
their credit, the media companies understand that they must compete, even if
they are uncertain how and therefore reluctant to do so. They are not trying to
use regulation to block new entrants -- only ensure that they have the ability
to compete themselves, by increasing their heft, and being able to sell ads
across different media, may in the theory let profitable radio and TV
businesses subsidize less profitable newspapers, as they re-engineer their
business model for the online world.
There is little time to lose.
In the case of the Wall Street Journal, News Corp was able to swallow Dow Jones so easily in part because
News Corp is performing so well, and a major reason is the website division.
News Corp bought MySpace, a social networking site -- and one of the most
popular sites on the Internet -- for around $600 million in 2005. But most
newspaper publishers, and media companies in general, have not been as bold.
They have been reluctant to change their businesses to adopt to convergence.
Lessons
From these examples,
companies in the West have been exposed to a few lessons (though whether they
have learned from them is another matter):
- Convergence is an
opportunity, not a threat.
- It enables the telecoms and
media sector to revitalize itself.
- It lets regulation be
updated for new technology and modern business.
If industry and policy makers
seize the opportunity of drafting new regulations:
- It offers rewards to
companies that embrace it.
- It is like telecoms
privatization, liberalization and deregulation in the 1980s: after short-term
uncertainty it will unlock success for many players -- both old and new.
- It will do this by growing
the overall pie, not just slicing it into different sized pieces.
- It benefits the public, and
enables firms to meet their mission helping society.
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* *
II. Technology Trends
Three trends in technology --
blogging, mobile TV and Web 2.0 -- are important to consider in the framework
of convergence and regulation, since they point in the direction that the
Internet as a medium is heading. Moreover, they expose problems with how
regulations are crafted for the online world (addressed in the next section).
Blogging
Blogs are usually described
as Òonline journalsÓ -- but that is dangerously inaccurate, because it misses
their fundamental importance. Journals are (mostly) private musings, locked on
paper and stored in a desk. Blogs are more than public thoughts -- they are
online conversations. They are implicitly about sharing information and
exchanging views. Their social nature is critical to appreciate. Second, they
are not about text but pictures, video and audio.
What is happening is that
just as publishing led to literacy, and then an outpouring of written works
(which later would lead to copyright laws and freedom of expression laws to
regulate idea in the 1700s, and overturn censorship by monarchies) we are
witnessing a similar transformation: a new form of audiovisual literacy among
the mass public -- available to a global audience instantaneously. (But the
regulations still treat this sort of media as something to be licensed, as IÕll
describe later).
Until recently, blogs were
considered unreliable writings by an army of unemployed, caffeinated nerds
writing in their bathrobes at home. Now they are mainstream. They are actually
not very new, having started in 1997. Between 2004 and 2006 the number of blog
posts doubled to as much as 1.3 million a day, according to data compiled by
the OECD. By now it may have doubled again (and bear in mind, some of this
commentary competes with mainstream media; all the newspapers and wire agencies
in the world could never publish close to 1 million dispatches a day). Today,
34% of blogs are in English (the second most popular language is Japanese,
comprising 21% of blogs), according to Technorati, which compiles data on
blogging. By 2006 there were more than 35 million blogs in China alone. So it
is a global phenomenon.
Mobile Television
Televisions used to be big
boxes with rabbit-ear antennas in the corner of the living room. There were a
small handful of stations, all heavily regulated for ownership, content, and
advertising amounts. The reason was that licenses were hard to come by since
spectrum was then considered scarce.
But today the idea of
television has changed completely. First, is the because of the Internet: sites
like YouTube allow individuals to ÒbroadcastÓ their video content. People can
access almost anything, at any time. The constraint of spectrum to get a
broadcast license no longer exists. The second change is with mobile phones. It
lets people access this content from anywhere, as well. Moreover, they can
produce content in the same way, since the phone is a two-way video technology
enabling sending as much as receiving. That is a radical change. However, it
should not be considered ÒbroadcastingÓ for two reasons: viewers actively
select the content, and the content is in most cases destined to a very narrow
audience.
Yet, while the technology has
changed enormously, the revisions to the regulations have not kept pace (as
will be discussed later). Today there is a big gap between the two, with big
consequences for the economy and public expression. Superficially,
maintaining archaic regulations
seems to thwart the ability of new companies to challenge media incumbents. But
on a deeper level, mobile TV actually offers established media groups the
chance to be even more successful -- provided they seize the opportunity to
reform their businesses.
Web 2.0
The term Web 2.0 is a confusing one, because it tends
to describe so many different things. Perhaps the best way to understand it is
to contrast it with what came before it. When the web first became a mainstream
medium in the mid 1990s, it was largely a passive medium -- people were
entertained by it like a television or a book. It was Òinteractive,Ó of course:
people could send emails or click on a link -- but this was more like talking
back, or changing the channel. It wasnÕt truly creative. The new iteration of
the web is. Web 2.0 is active, not passive. (Or as one famous formulation put
it: the web has gone from being a ÒnounÓ to a Òverb.Ó
A distinguishing element is
social networking and open collaboration. People or processes come together on
the fly to interact and do new things. So, for example, Google offers a map
service, with an open API or programming hook, for other developers to write
web software programs to interact with. So we can visualize other information
atop a map -- such as the location of American presidential campaign
contributors (from interacting with the US Federal Election CommissionÕs online
database), or real-estate listings. This is a very primitive example of Web
2.0, but it explains the idea.
Yet the most important trait
is constant change. We are building this medium, the aggregation of more than a
billion individual contributions. The very term ÒWeb 2.0Ó implicitly reminds us
that nothing prevents, indeed the nature of the technology begets, a Web 3.0,
4.0 and so on. The technology is not stable, like so many other communications
media like radio, TV and even telephones. This continual metamorphose -- or
Òregenerativity,Ó in the phrase of Professor Jonathan Zittrain of Oxford
Internet Institute and Harvard Law School -- is in part due to its open,
decentralized, bottom-up character. Nobody owns it, yet we all contribute to
it.
Regulatory policy will have a
hard time applying classic rules covering media and communications onto Web
2.0. The idea of ÒorganizationsÓ that used to have articles of incorporation,
headquarters, meeting minutes, ledgers and a bank account, is now replaced by
self-organizing bands of people and groups that collaborate and dissipate like
the tide. We will have to design new regulatory rules -- and we will only learn
what they are from experience, not before the fact.
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III. Errors in Regulation
These technology trends are
important to understand in the context of two regulatory pushes: the EU
Audiovisual Media Services Directive of 2007, and recent proposed legislation
in the US to mandate Ònetwork neutrality.Ó In both cases, there were problems
in how regulators thought through the rules that are useful to understand so as
to avoid the errors.
EU Audiovisual Media
Services Directive
The European UnionÕs
Audiovisual Media Services Directive was approved in December 2007 and must be
transposed into national law by member states by the end of 2009. It was
designed to modernize the ÒTelevision Without FrontiersÓ directives of 1989 and
1997 that was designed to facilitate cross-border market entrance among
broadcasters by harmonizing European rules. It places controls over content,
programming times, and advertising amounts.
For example, a draft
liberalized the frequency of an advertising break allowed in film programming
from every 45 minutes to every 35 minutes. But in return, ad breaks for news
and childrenÕs shows -- the least commercially viable programming -- increased
from every 30 minutes to 35 minutes. This is the degree to which television is
regulated; and this is what constitutes reform.
Most importantly, the
directive introduces the idea of ÒlinearÓ vs Ònon-linearÓ content. There is a
fuzzy, gray area between the two, but basically linear content is programming
that sort of looks and feels like regular TV from 1970: it reaches a wide
audience, there is scheduling, it is for-profit, the station keeps a record of
what appeared and when, etc. On the other hand, Ònon-linearÓ content is
material that may be intended for a small audience, done without a commercial
motive, viewed by people on specific request (such as clicking in a web link,
as opposed to turning on the set).
The problem with these
definitions is that the are artificial, and try to reproduce the classic
ÒlicensingÓ model of broadcasting onto a medium that has few characteristics of
the traditional television model. Today, anyone can be a ÒTV stationÓ today,
just as anyone could be a ÒpublisherÓ in 1455, but new rules restrict this. It
is not ÒbroadcastingÓ but ÒnarrowcastingÓ -- it often goes to a small audience
rather than the broad public, even if it is accessible to anyone.
So why did the EU draft a
policy that seemed to apply classic regulatory models onto a new medium that
did not require such control, since the original justification of regulation --
the broad public and the scarce spectrum allocation -- does not exist on the
web? The reason is because public broadcasters, feeling threatened, sought to
define ÒlinearÓ vs Ònon-linearÓ content with a gray areas so as to place the
same regulatory burdens on new online content creators. As one pan-European
mobile phone company executive quipped to The Economist in October 2006: anything that increases the barrier
to entry for content providers is a good thing for his firm.
But this is short-sighted.
What many of todayÕs incumbents are now realizing is that instead of using
regulation to block new rivals, they can use the combination of new technology
and a permissive regulatory environment to launch new sorts of audiovisual
programming online and on mobile phones that compete very successfully against
the start-ups. Incumbent broadcasters in Europe did not appreciate the degree
to which easing the rules would benefit them greatly, since they have
professional content, an established audience base, and most importantly, have
production and programming management expertise (that is, they understand
audience tastes and how to manage a large organization that caters to it).
But today, media groups are
starting to understand that they are very well placed to benefit from
convergence and new regulation -- provided that they donÕt make the mistake of
trying to hold it back.
US legislation on Ònetwork
neutralityÓ
The term Ònetwork neutralityÓ
refers to the idea that the Internet should as far as possible be an ÒopenÓ and
ÒneutralÓ platform for parties to send and receive traffic, without a
middleman, the network service provider, acting as either a censor or a
tollbooth. This idea of the Òend-to-endÓ nature of the Internet is one of its
founding principles: the network was designed to be as decentralized as
possible, in contrast to the telephone network that was highly centralized and
usage was tightly controlled (in terms of what devices could connect to the
network and the services it offered, less the actual content).
The idea of network
neutrality is what underpins the amazing innovation that has taken place over
the Internet, including not least the World Wide Web itself (which was not
invented by Internet engineers but a British physicist working in Geneva in
1991). Take away network neutrality, and you basically destroy the Internet,
say purists.
For example, telecom
operators could demand that websites like Google and eBay share some of their
revenue for sending so much data over their networks. Or, cable companies that
offer Internet access might block video sites since it competes with their core
offering, just as telecoms firms can block Internet calling to protect their
core revenue. Network operators such as AT&T, Verizon and Comcast,
meanwhile, argue that they need to increase their revenue streams if they are
to pay the huge costs of upgrading the networks to handle all the traffic these
big and lucrative companies are sending.
In fact, this week the FCC is
meeting at Harvard Law School to hear views on the network neutrality issue. It
comes as a cable provider, Comcast, stands accused of intentionally slowing
down the service of BitTorrent, a popular peer-to-peer file-sharing service,
which consumes a lot of bandwidth as many people illegally download copyrighted
music.
Internet companies such as
Google and eBay have lobbied Congress to introduce a number of pieces of
legislation to mandate network neutrality (though none have become law). One
that has made the rounds in previous and the current legislative sessions is
the ÒInternet Freedom ActÓ submitted by Ed Markey (a Massachusetts Democrat)
and Charles Pickering (a Missouri Republican). It would oblige the FCC to
institute Òopen-accessÓ rules that forbid network providers from interfering
with lawful content over their networks.
The problem is that the
policy, although sensible, is unworkable: network operators have to prioritize
the heavy data over their networks -- and the best way to solve resource
allocation issues is through economics, eg, forcing people to pay more.
Moreover, the legislation presumes that there is only one economic model for
the Internet -- the one that currently exists. For a medium that is
characterized by constant change, that is a very spurious presumption. The
rules actually tend to centralize a system that is distinguished by its
decentralization.
Furthermore, the rules will
surely have unintended consequences which may disturb the natural technical
evolution of the network. (There were many other moments in the history of the
Internet in which regulation seemed necessary -- such as an Internet service
provider interconnection dispute in 1994 and the controversy over Òpeering
among ISPs in 1998 -- but the Internet weathered the storms through the
marketplace.) Indeed, the law may not even be needed if classic instruments of
regulatory policy are applied, such as interconnection, non-discrimination, market
dominance, etc.
In the end, network
neutrality seems like a good thing and worthy of being preserved. It is like
free trade: the least encumbrance among parties in an exchange as possible. But
from the way that lawmakers and special interest groups have participated in
the debate, the legislation would undermines their worthy goals, by foisting
uncompromising regulations onto a medium that has often shown it evolves best
when left to the minimum of control.
Indeed, the error here is
regulatory over-reach: the central problem is the scarcity of access and
transmission -- that is, the lack of a true market in network providers. That
ought be addressed in itself, rather than treating just the consequence of this
inefficient market. Instead, network neutrality legislation presumes
policymakers are better than the market to establish revenue models -- a
difficult view to sustain, particularly in case where the underlying technology
and business models are continually open to change.
Summary
What unites these two
regulatory errors with the three technology trends I identified earlier is the
idea that the Internet that we have is one that we are building ourselves. That
it is typified by user-generated content, developed in a bottom-up,
collaborative and often non-proprietary, not-for-profit way. It is giving rise
to new businesses and business models that will surely challenge todayÕs
incumbents in media and telecoms. But that the experience of the West is that
regulation that tries to protect one party or another risks holding everyone
back.
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Conclusion
Convergence leads to benefits
to companies provided they take the initiative. It also represents a chance to
clean up the regulatory mess that has accumulated over the past century of policy
covering print, radio and television as these three media merge. Indeed the two
things go hand in hand.
It is important to set the policy well now, considering what lies just over the horizon. While today convergence refers to the commingling of networks, services, devices and industries that were formerly separate, in future it will refer to a melding of the physical and virtual worlds through Òubiquitous networking.Ó This refers to the way in which we will embed networking connections in everything from machines, objects, appliances, buildings, the environment, even human bodies for medical purposes. That is convergence on a totally different scale. We need to set the rules for this iteration of convergence well now, since the really hard questions are still to come.
Although keeping an eye on
the future is important, for the moment we need to focus on the hear-and-now.
Japan is well placed to do well in this new world of media, telecoms and
technology convergence. Provided the right regulatory structure is in place,
there may be a flourishing media
industry on many types of platforms. The countryÕs expertise in hardware,
leadership in broadband and the creativity of its public, may unleash new
innovations, services and business models.
What brings us here today is
the Japanese governmentÕs process to revise its telecoms and broadcasting laws
to fit modern communications technologies. It is a very important process and I
congratulate the Japanese government and business leaders for their foresight, dedication
and goodwill. I recognize that the current regulatory structures are familiar
to many companies. Changing them seems to undermine market arrangements that
today seem to serve all parties well. Moreover, the changes in technology
create uncertainty for companiesÕ businesses.
The mistakes made in Europe
and American suggest that it would have made more sense for large companies to
have embraced the changes and not resisted them. In fact, the changes can
actually be more rewarding for companies than sticking with the status quo. The
other lesson from the experiences of American and European companies is that a
failure to change, an attempt to stay the same, entails a large cost: the
technology is not held back forever, and the global market is unfriendly to
those who fail to adapt.
Regulations can assist these
changes, but when they are used to protect some players against competition,
they not only hurt the public interest -- they end up actually holding back the
companies that sought them in the first place. That is because convergence
tends to increase the size of the overall pie, not diminish the slice of
current players. But this is provided that business leaders and regulators are
willing to rise to the challenge and accept the need to change, to serve the
public.
I hope that Japan might find
the experiences of the EU and US useful in its reflection process for the
countryÕs regulatory reform.
Thank you.
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