Draft
essay (rev. 23sept07) for: "The Power of Ideas: Internet Governance in a
Global Multistakeholder Environ-ment " (Wolfgang KleinwŠchter, ed.), Nov.
2007 (forthcoming).
The Next Internet Governance Battles
By Kenneth Neil Cukier
I. Introduction:
TomorrowÕs Network Will Be Different Than TodayÕs
The current debate over
Internet governance risks becoming obsolete because the technology,
architecture and use of the network is undergoing radical change. Yet
policymakers are largely unaware of these changes. As a result, they are
Òfighting the last war,Ó so to speak. Rather than looking at the new challenges
of naming and numbering in the next decade and beyond, they presume that the
Internet that existed in 1998 when ICANN was created, and which operates today,
will be the one that exists tomorrow.
But this is just not so. And
trying to devise policies based on this would be like establishing rules for
the telegraph just as the age of the telephone begins. Three forces are
transforming how the Internet works: ubiquitous networking, new technical
architectures and the developing worldÕs telecoms growth. This essay provides
an overview of the changes taking place and considers their impact on the
management of critical Internet resources (while noting shortcomings with
existing approaches).
The first force is
technology: the Internet is going from a network comprised of PCs to one in
which all manner of devices -- from cars to washing machines to sensors on
buildings, bridges, trees and inside people -- communicate over a network. It
may sound like science fiction but initial versions already exist and the
technology will be commonplace in about ten yearÕs time. This Òubiquitous
networkingÓ will place new demands on naming and numbering policy. It may even
be the case that the most efficient approach is to bypass the current domain
name system altogether.
The second change is in the
architecture of the network: Internet engineers are redesigning the underlying
protocols of the Internet so that they can better mature for more robust uses.
In so doing, the engineers are calling into question certain tenants of the
network dating back 35 years, that are enshrined in the way that Internet names
and numbers are managed. Although it is too early to say how the new network
might look, it is clear that the network will be different. Indeed, the very
ÒuniformityÓ of the InternetÕs architecture may be among the first sacrosanct
principles to go.
The third change regards
international development: the most impressive network growth has been in
developing countries, not the West, and via the mobile phone, not the PC. New
devices are being designed especially for this market. New applications and
uses are also emerging. So far, the Internet has been created and used by Òthe
first one billionÓ users -- and its infrastructure coordination naturally
reflects this. Yet when the second and third billion users from developing
countries join the information society, as they are starting to do, it calls
into questions certain naming and numbering policies. Issues germane to the
developing world will need to be better taken into account.
The result of these changes
it that when governments discuss Internet governance and the management of
critical Internet resources, they do so in a time-capsule. Ultimately, by
trying to assert more control, governments may find they have planted their
flagpoles into a sandbar -- for the network is in the process of a dramatic
transformation for which the Internet-governance community is unprepared.
II. The Era of Ubiquitous Networking
The Internet today has
slightly more than 1 billion users and mobile phones subscribers number around
2.7 billion. But this is nothing when compared to the amount of things that can
be attached to a network, to send information about their status, location and
operation, as well as to link with other devices to do new things. Over the
next ten years, the Internet will be characterized by all manner of machines,
structures, environments and peopleÕs bodies connected to a network at all
times. The network will need to accommodate a trillion devices, engineers
estimate.
The groundwork for this has
already been laid. Consider: around 10 billion microprocessors will be sold
this year, embedded in everything from computers and coffee-makers to cars.
Today, most of them ÒthinkÓ but do not ÒtalkÓ -- that is, they do certain tasks
but do not communicate. Yet this is changing. As the cost, size and power
requirements of chips decline, and their performance increases, communications
functions are being integrated into processors, mainly with wireless
technology. At the same time, the wireless industry is investing billions of
dollars to deploy 3G and nascent 4G (WiMax) high-speed mobile networks.
The technologies that already
exist are staggering. For instance, a wireless chip for mobile phones that in
2003 cost $50 is today $5. Chips used for the Global Positioning System or
Bluetooth wireless connections now cost as little as $1 and are the size of a
matchhead. Chips for Zigbee technology, used for short-range sensors, which
currently cost around $4 and are the size of a fingernail, are expected to
shrink to a quarter of the price and size in five years. A far simpler kind of
chip called a radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag, which sends a tiny bit
of data over a short range when activated, can already be manufactured for 4
cents apiece. Hitachi has a prototype chip that fits into the groove of a
thumb-print. In 2006 one billion RFID chips were sold and the figure is expected
to almost double in 2007. And RFIDs are becoming more sophisticated, developing
into true, two-way communications systems.
These technologies enable all
sorts of things to connect to a network. For example, industrial building
companies are preparing to commercialize products that add a small wireless
node to every light fixture. This would enable them to be turned on and off
remotely, as well as do new things, such as act as networked smoke detectors
and security alarms. Cars are going beyond satellite navigational systems to
include wireless modules that alert emergency-services in case of an accident,
do electronic toll charges and traffic monitoring. Consumer-electronics makers
are adding networking modules as a way to sell content services. Appliance
manufacturers are looking at embedding communications in their products to
regulate power consumption, upgrade software and provide Òpreventive
maintenance.Ó
Meanwhile, bridges and
buildings are getting sensors to continually monitor their structural health --
an important issue in light of a devastating bridge collapse in the US in the
summer of 2007. The environment is also being monitored by sensors for climate
change, as well as for more efficient farming. Amazingly, new networking
technologies are being introduced inside peopleÕs bodies for medical purposes,
such as to scan the intestinal tract or monitor the blood fluid inside of a
personÕs heart to detect and prevent congestive heart failure. And it bears
emphasizing that these technologies are not scribbles on paper in R&D labs
but products undergoing regulatory approval and already being sold by major
companies like General Electric, Philips, Honeywell and others.
This will change the Internet
governance debate in profound ways. The Internet addressing system was designed
for individuals to locate content from somewhat central repositories. In the
future, it will be called on to allow billions of autonomous, self-organizing
devices to interconnect with one another on the fly. Basic things like ensuring
identity and security -- tricky on todayÕs far simpler Internet -- will become
exponentially more difficult.
The current approach to
Internet coordination is not perfectly suited to this environment. For example,
the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) addressing system was designed with
around 4.3 billion unique addresses. The stock of addresses will be depleted by
between 2010 and 2013, according to officials at IP address registries. A
ÒgraymarketÓ in addresses has already formed. Moves to transition to IPv6,
which offers quadrillions of addresses, has been slow. Despite the huge amount
of addresses their number is finite: unless care is exercised in their
allocation, a similar shortage may emerge.
Moreover, the current
policies make presumptions about how the Internet is used, when it is a
variable, not constant, determinant. For instance, ICANNÕs rules covering
domain-name registries takes for granted that names are used to identify
websites, as they did in 1998 when ICANN was created and the Web was less than
a decade old. The idea that a name might refer not to a site per se, but a
continuously changing ÒinstantiationÓ of information is not envisaged.
Furthermore, an environment of ÒWeb 2.0Ó data flows mean that a web address may
represent nothing more than the commingling of numerous discrete operations
from different servers into a single service. Thus, a domain name might be
automatically generated and only ÒaliveÓ for a day, or even a few seconds. Who
is to say? Yet ICANNÕs policy of taking part of registration fees to support
its operations disrupts these potential uses.
This example is not
imaginary. In the March 2003 ICANN meeting in Rome, a representative of SITA,
the airline consortium that operates .aero, explained that the group wanted to
create a specific domain name for every commercial flight every day, so that
the aviation industry as well as consumers could obtain information about it,
from ground maintenance to flight delays. But SITA could not deploy it due to
ICANNÕs fee structure. Add to this a world in which every plane-engine has 20
different sensors all generating data in real-time, and the extent of the
problem only grows. The point of this example is not to remedy this issue per
se, but to underscore how policies can unwittingly stifle innovation.
With the need to provide
identifiers to every networked object, there will probably be an engineering
incentive to bypass the InternetÕs domain name system altogether. If this
happened, it would mark an ironic twist. Just as governments started to get
their hands around what Internet governance means by way of venues like the
World Summit on the Information Society and the Internet Governance Forum, the
very nature of what they debated changed shape, rendering their huffing and
puffing rather moot.
III. Re-Engineering the
NetworkÕs Design
The Internet is not a series
of tubes. It evolved like sedimentary rock, with newer technologies layered
upon older ones. This has so far worked, but it does not scale well. To meet
the future demands of a trillion connected devices, efforts are underway among
Internet engineers to redesign the Internet. It is a way to pull out
superfluous things, as well as incorporate features that were not initially a
priority but are today regarded as important, such as better
identity-authentication to minimize spam and hacking.
Two initiatives are taking
place under the US National Science Foundation. One is the Global Environment
for Network Investigations (GENI), to build an advanced test-bed network for
piloting new protocols and applications. The second is Future Internet Design
(FIND), which considers specific ways the internet can be changed to address
future needs. There is also a European Union initiative called EURO-NF (for
ÒNetwork of the FutureÓ) with around 35 European institutions participating,
mainly universities. A number of research proposals in the US have come forward
that would change the way the Internet works, and with it, aspects of Internet
governance.
One technique is ÒInternet
indirection infrastructure.Ó It would overlay an addressing system atop of
current Internet Protocol addresses, which would better enable mobility and
multicast applications by bypassing the current point-to-point approach in
circumstances when routing traffic that way is inefficient. A second idea is
called Òactive networksÓ or Òmetanets.Ó It would permit diversity at the core
of the network not just at the edge, by replacing routers with devices that can
dynamically load new protocols. Applications would be able to reprogram the
devices through the network for a specific protocol, optimized for the
communications. The device would partition itself internally to support
multiple, mini private networks.
How the network ultimately
looks due to these proposals is unclear -- but change it will. It may require
that things like IP address assignments be done differently -- or change the
nature of IP addresses themselves. Would the institutions that exist based on
the current DNS system be comfortable ceasing operations due to changes in
technology? Or, would their first inclination be to resist the technical
changes under the banner of upholding the InternetÕs ÒstabilityÓ? The larger
point is that the InternetÕs underlying technology is something dynamic, not
static, but is treated as stable by officials considering Internet governance
policy.
IV. The Developing
World Joins the Network
In 1995, when the US
government first hosted discussions that would eventually lead to the creation
of ICANN, around 94% of Internet hosts were located in the 31 industrialized
countries that comprised the OECD. Today, the figure is closer to 50%. China
has the most broadband subscribers in the world with over 100 million users,
and the Chinese language has surpassed English as the dominant language on the
Web. There are more than 35 million bloggers in China alone. China also has the
most mobile phone subscribers, with more than 500 million users. India is
coming up fast, and with China its companies are the biggest owners of sub-sea
fiber optical Internet cables.
At the same time, the Gulf
states are pouring some of their enormous oil wealth into major IT initiatives,
allocating mobile phone licenses and even buying mobile networks around the
world. In Saudi Arabia -- where mobile phone penetration has gone from 6% to 60% and Internet use grown three-fold since 2000 --
the Kingdom is investing $200 billion to
create six new Òeconomic citiesÓ to attract international businesses,
particularly high-tech firms.
Meanwhile, Africa has the
highest new mobile phone subscription rates in the world; in many countries the
number of new users more than double annually. In countries where many people
live on less than $1 a day and gross domestic product is actually falling,
mobile phone adoption is nevertheless increasing. Worldwide, 1.6 million new
mobile phone subscribers are added every day. More broadly, in 2006 for the
first time in history, more than half of the worldÕs gross domestic product
came from developing countries.
The striking thing about
these trends is that the developing world is joining the information society
using a different model than the West. Instead of one person-one PC, as in
industrialized countries, computers are more commonly shared among many users
and the mobile phone is the device by which most people participate on the
network. Today, it is mainly for phone calls -- the networks and devices do not
support much Internet access and illiteracy is a major issue. But the variety
and richness of mobile services are increasing rapidly, tailored to local
needs. In time, the phones will basically be primitive Internet devices.
Moreover, they may operate in
ways that are different than todayÕs Internet. For instance, in the project One
Laptop Per Child, the networking modules for the $100 laptops are being
designed to enable peer-communications rather than just linking onto the
Internet backbone. This means that more network traffic may be off of the
public Internet and privately routed. New addressing systems might be created
to make this smoother, bypassing the traditional DNS.
Furthermore, mobile phone
numbers rather than ICANNÕs domain name system may be the most common
identifiers used for most people online. This would give developing nations
more control over information than they could ever enjoy via ICANN, since phone
numbers and networks fall under national telecoms regulatory agencies. It is a
power that China exercised when it was able to censor mobile phone SMS messages
during the SARS outbreak in 2003.
The rise of the developing
world online affects how the InternetÕs infrastructure is managed. For
instance, setting a wholesale rate of a few dollars for a domain name is
prohibitively expensive in many countries -- an issue to which ICANN is
sensitive. It also throws a spotlight on Internet governance in a world in
which the 5 billion people who live in poor countries need to share the network
resources with the 1 billion that are already connected. (As Chinese officials
used grumble in the late 1990s, there were more IP addresses at Stanford
University than in all of the Middle Kingdom.) How IP addresses are allocated
and root servers are maintained and deployed may be open to scrutiny. Most
importantly, it poses embarrassing questions to ICANN about why it is taking so
long to introduce ÒinternationalizedÓ domain names, so people can use local
scripts to send emails and navigate the Web.
V. Conclusion: The
Heraclitian Internet
Taken together, the forces of
ubiquitous networking, new Internet architecture and the developing worldÕs
network growth, renders todayÕs Internet governance discussions somewhat passŽ.
The magnitude of these changes is on a similar scale to the revolution of the
Internet itself relative to the telephone system, a change that is still being
digested by the telecoms industry, policy makers and society.
The Internet is only 35 years
old, and as mainstream medium, not much older than a decade. Yet already there
have been many iterations. In 1969 the national backbone ran at 56 kilobytes
per second; by 1997 that speed was possible on a home modem; in 2007 users in
Japan, Korea and Hong Kong enjoy 100 megabyte access. When the Internet was
first designed, it linked 13 supercomputer centers at American universities and
supported several hundred users, each of whom had to be approved to go online.
Commercial traffic was forbidden. Domain names were not created until around 15
years later, in 1985, and today seems an archaic technology. There is no reason
to believe they must continue to exist in the future.
This Internet history bears
remembering, since it highlights the degree to which the network we use today
is not set in stone but mutable, plastic, ever-changing. Likewise, its
Ògovernance,Ó viewed in historical perspective, is a series of changing rules
and rulers. First, officials from DARPA, the US militaryÕs research arm, called
the shots -- though they largely let the engineers from academia do what they
considered best, a process referred to as ÒInternet self-governanceÓ (later,
the term ÒselfÓ would get left out). Then the academic-funding agency NSF had
control, but again deferred to the ÒInternet community.Ó This grouping of
researchers and network operators from academia and industry created around a
dozen organizational structures over two decades, each with a new abbreviation:
ICCP, NWG, IAB, IESG, IETF, IANA to name a few. What they actually stand for is
not so important: the end result was that a set of institutions and mechanisms
were established to manage the network.
Yet they never lasted long.
One notable feature of the history of Internet governance is that institutions
sometimes did not adapt to the changes in the network. Instead, they became
obsolete and were superceded by new ones. By 1998, because these self-governance
processes were considered too informal and relied too much on the US
government, the US privatized and internationalized the system -- by creating
ICANN. Ironically, the group then spent most of its time fighting off criticism
that it was too informal and too American.
If the past offers a lesson,
it is that both the network and its governance system are in a constant state
of transformation, not something static that can have a set definition or rules
applied for ever after. In the InternetÕs early stages, both protocols and
policy were made on the fly by engineers addressing concerns as they emerged.
But in trying to formalize this with ICANN, policy became Òex anteÓ (ie,
something that must be known in advance) rather than ÒemergentÓ (ie, continually
revised based on changing circumstances).
The mismatch is that while
ICANN (like any administrative institution) sets rigid polices, the technology
remains emergent and ever-changing -- as witnessed by the rise of ubiquitous
networking, new Internet architecture and telecoms in the developing world.
This tension is inherent to ICANN and a reason why it is by nature a
conservative force. Ultimately, the Internet is like HeraclitesÕ river. Just as
we never step into the same stream two times, so too we never log onto the same
network twice. Will todayÕs Internet governance institutions prove as fluid?
What are the consequences if they do not?
_______________
Kenneth Neil Cukier is a
correspondent for The Economist and writing a book on the history of Internet
governance.