The Four Myths of Modern Telecommunications
Eversheds Dinner-Discussion, July 12th 2006
The House of Lords; London, UK
By Kenneth Neil Cukier
Technology and Telecoms Correspondent, The
Economist
Introduction:
Good evening. Let me begin by
thanking Lord Foulkes and Alan Jenkins, as well as Neil Brown and Graeme Gordon
of Eversheds for the opportunity to talk to you tonight.
As an American in these
august halls of Parliament, I cannot help but draw references to history, to
the past. And that may be an appropriate place to begin my thoughts on the
Òfour myths of telecommunications.Ó To fully appreciate where we are today,
letÕs take a moment to consider where we were as far back as ten years ago,
five years ago and as recently as just last year.
Ten years ago -- 1996:
The advent of liberalization and deregulation.
Think about the industry a
decade ago: France Telecom, for example, was 100% owned by the state and was
run as an arm of government (it didnÕt take a corporate form until 1997, and
its shares listed a year later). All throughout Europe, the situation was
largely the same. There was no competition. If you were a corporate customer
and wanted to get a leased line, you had to pay exorbitant prices and wait
weeks, possibly months, for it to be installed. There were no ÒcustomersÓ in
telecoms -- only Òrate-payers.Ó
At the same time, if you
recall, mobile phones were considered a luxury item, and few people had them.
There was a good reason why they were considered a luxury -- the prices were outrageous.
Pre-paid tariffs didnÕt yet exist on a large scale. SMS didnÕt exist either,
for the most part. And BlackBerries, for instance, were not introduced until
2000.
Five years ago -- 2001:
The dot-com bubble popped.
It was the crash of the
dot-com delirium, and with it, the IT and telecoms sectors. For example, a year
after buying 3G wireless licenses for tens of billions of dollars, some of the
operators had to shed their mobile divisions in order to remain solvent.
In America, the WorldCom accounting
scandal brought it into bankruptcy. AT&T started its collapse. And of the
many billions of dollars spent on infrastructure, the vast majority had to be
written off. Consider: Tyco spent over $2.5 billion laying undersea cables
connecting three continents. Last year it sold it to an Indian telecoms company
called VSNL for a mere $130 million -- pennies on the pound. Today, there is so
much excess capacity that it is impossible to use it all. VSNL bought the
infrastructure as a matter of national economic security, since IndiaÕs economy
is predicated its ability to ship digital information around the world. Yet,
although VSNL paid a pittance, the revenue VSNL earns from the capacity doesnÕt
even cover the systemÕs operating costs.
Still, throughout all the
difficulties, something else was going on: Internet traffic continued to double
every year; mobile use soared. Prices dropped. And keep in mind that many of
todayÕs staple technology trends -- from blogs and wikis to iPods -- didnÕt
even exist. Google was just getting known.
One year ago -- 2005:
The rise of broadband.
Last year was a period of new
network build-outs, a time when telecoms had clearly turned a corner. But what
is most interesting about the rise in broadband is that it is not for Internet
access. ItÕs not for voice either. ItÕs for all sorts of things -- the ÒtelcoÓ
has disappeared and in its place has simply come the Òcommunications carrier,Ó
offering a quadruple-play of Internet, voice, mobile and even TV. Soon it will
be quintuple-play, IÕm sure, and on and on until journalists deplete their
knowledge of Greek prefixes.
WeÕve also seen
consolidation. EuropeÕs incumbent operators are attacking each otherÕs markets,
and using convergence as their way in -- Telefonica in Britain via O2 (which it
acquired last year); France Telecom throughout Europe via Orange (which
recently bundled its mobile and broadband arms). In America, AT&T (which
was acquired last year by nothing less than a ÒBaby Bell,Ó SBC) has started to
sell television.
The lessons are
two-fold: the power of regulation and the power of the market.
Regulation and the market
shouldnÕt seem to be diametrically opposed forces, or hostile to one another.
Rather, each needs the other. The power of regulation is that it brings competition.
And the power of the market is that it brings investment, as well as better
services and lower prices for consumers. It is a symbiotic relationship.
Yet I draw attention to the
past not to praise our accomplishments as an industry, but so that it can
inform our thinking when we look to the future.
We know very little about the
future of technology and telecoms, but we know this: tomorrow will be different
than today. This may sound obvious, but it is hard to appreciate in practice.
Often, regulation forgets this and presumes that tomorrow will look just like
today. (Think of AmericaÕs 1996 Telecom Act, that barely mentioned the
Internet.) We know a second thing: we cannot predict today what will happen
tomorrow. And a third thing: enlightened public policy -- or at least the
challenge of regulation -- is to set rules today that do not inhibit
developments that may emerge in future.
But the thorny bit comes when
we look closely at what is happening between past and future -- here, in the
present. When I do this, I see four myths of modern telecoms.
Myth One -- Telecoms
companies provide telecommunications.
No: Many sorts of
companies are in the telecoms business now -- regulations must encourage this,
not see it as a problem because it doesnÕt fit into classic categories.
For example, consider eBay.
What business is it in? It relies on the Internet as its sales channel, but it
is not really an Internet company -- itÕs an auction house. But is it really in
the auction business? It is certainly in the software business. And last year
it bought a private software company -- and paid around $3 billion for it. It
is called Skype, which lets people make phone calls just like sending email --
for free, regardless of distance. So is eBay really an auction house? Well, yes
-- but itÕs also a communications company.
This pattern -- of companies
masquerading as being in one business, but actually doing something related to
telecoms -- is repeated everywhere in the technology sector. Think about Google.
It serves up searches on the Web. In fact, it has become so important, and so
dominant, that perhaps we should apply the Òessential facilitiesÓ test to it
and regulate the firm. After all, Google has become an indispensable on-ramp to
the information society for millions of people. (Of course, by regulating it we
might destroy the very entrepreneurial spirit that gave life to Google in the
first place, and decrease the incentives for venture capital investors, et
cetera).
But what is Google doing? If
you read its financial statements, its biggest expense is not bandwidth or
R&D but real-estate. It needs two things: space for computer-server farms,
and access to electricity. Why does it want all those servers? To serve up ads
alongside web pages? No. Because its end-game is advertising on a much bigger
scale -- Google wants to display personalised ads in real-time on broadcast
television. That is where the real ad money is. Meanwhile, Yahoo is investing
in programming. So should they be regulated by the EUÕs ÒTelevision Without
FrontiersÓ directive? Would that make sense?
There are other examples. The
biggest computer maker is not Dell but Nokia, since mobile phones are achieving
the functionality of PCs. We think Apple is a computer maker but with iPods,
they are in the digital-content business, and with iTunes, the communications
sector. The point is basic: telecoms isnÕt something necessarily done by
telecoms companies anymore. Smart regulatory policy must take this into
account.
Myth Two -- Centralising
regulation is a good thing.
Not always: There is an
intermediary period in which regulations will overlap, and industry will be
forced to serve two masters -- probably to the satisfaction of neither.
On the surface, the idea of
centralising regulations seems a good thing -- we like harmonising rules. But
it often entails a transition that, if handled badly, could create problems. As
an example, consider the EUÕs proposal to regulate mobile roaming charges,
which was unveiled today. In some respects, it is a good thing: tariffs are
high.
But look at it in another
way. From the point of view of the mobile operators, after paying huge sums to
national regulators for 3G spectrum and binding themselves to their stringent
rules, here comes a supranational regulator changing the rules of the game in
mid play. This isnÕt what they thought they were buying into when they paid for
the spectrum -- do they deserve a rebate? Should countries be forced to return
some of the auction revenue to operators because the integrity of contract has
been violated?
In terms of the roaming
rules, we can probably empathise with the commission, since the prices seem
unnaturally high. And we can appreciate the idea of centralising rules to make
them more efficient. In Vivian RedingÕs review of telecom regulations, she
floated the idea of an EU-wide regulator -- a Òsuper-regulatorÓ to oversee the
national regulatory agencies. It is a worthwhile thing to consider. But the
point is that in our zeal to centralise regulations for efficiencyÕs sake, we
sometimes overlook the transitional period it takes to get from here to there,
which must be carefully handled.
Myth Three --
Regulators must preserve the openness of the Internet.
No: Let the market develop
the optimal approach for the information society to advance, and if there is a
market-failure or identifiable anticompetitive practices, fix that.
The idea of ÒopennessÓ lies
at the heart of the Internet, and has been responsible for its phenomenal
growth. It is a result of technical decisions made in the 1960s and Ô70s by the
small group of American techies who built the Internet. It is called the
Òend-to-endÓ principle. It means that any user can reach any other directly:
the network is Òneutral.Ó
This is a complete contrast
to the telecoms system, which is a centralised network. If you want to add a
new service, you have to knock on the door of the telecoms operator and ask
permission. But on the Internet, the end-to-end design means that users are
autonomous and can control what they do, without interference from any central
organization who may have an interest in the network doing one thing but not
another.
The result is innovation. A
British physicist working in Geneva can create the World Wide Web; an Israeli
can develop a popular instant messaging system (called ICQ) that can become
wildly popular and spread widely. An 18 year old in California can create
software for sharing music for free -- Napster -- and place it on the internet
where it takes off, to dismay of the recording labels. In short, the end-to-end
principle underpins the InternetÕs genius. It is like free-trade: open
interaction among parties, free of roadblocks.
However, the ÒneutralityÓ of
the network is under attack. Telecom operators -- for the moment in America but
this is starting to come to Europe, too -- are asking why they should only earn
income from charging the end-user, rather than also from sites like Google or
eBay that blast huge amounts of traffic across their pipes. Operators are investing
billions into building new high-speed networks, and feel they should be allowed
to monetise it as they see fit. In June, it became a major political issue in
America, after legislation was proposed in Congress to enshrine the idea of
Ònetwork neutralityÓ (as the politicians call it) into law.
Network neutrality is a good
thing, because it leads to innovation -- telecom operators canÕt act as toll
booths on the information highway. Start-ups will have the same chance of
competing with bigger firms, and big firms wonÕt face extortion from operators,
who could otherwise allocate poorer bandwidth.
That said, do we really want
a law to preserve the end-to-end principle? IsnÕt it somewhat Òun-Internet-likeÓ to write into stone anything about the Internet, as
if to say that a technology characterised by rapid change has a dimension to it
that must never change? Moreover, isnÕt odd that we like the end-to-end concept
because it resembles a free-market approach to content and services -- yet want
to abrogate the role of the market to preserve it? If it were truly optimal,
why would we need to mandate it in law? Such a rule would implicitly suggest
that there is only one economic model for the Internet. For a network typified
by experimentation and diversity, this is unlikely.
The point is that although
the ÒopennessÓ of the Internet is probably worth preserving, it makes more
sense to let the market work out the best arrangement. If problems arise due to
concentration of power -- which could be treated under normal antitrust rules
-- we can remedy that, specifically. This seems better than creating rules for
the Internet under the presumption that government knows what is best for the
Internet for all time.
Myth Four -- We must
apply market approaches to wireless spectrum allocation.
No: This reform does not
go far enough; we need to establish a huge swath of space for unlicensed
spectrum -- a spectrum commons -- to promote innovation.
All wireless devices rely on
radio spectrum, from mobile phones to broadcast television -- it is a scarce
resource, the oil of the digital age. But the way that the spectrum is
allocated is inefficient: regulators cleave off big chunks and grant them to
companies (in the past for free, now for huge sums of money). The conditions
are you can only use it for a specific, pre-defined purpose, and you canÕt
share it, trade it or sell it.
This is ludicrous. Economists
know that resources are often better managed when there is an incentive, such
as by granting property-rights. Otherwise, it can lead to a Òtragedy of the
commons.Ó Applying market principles is more efficient: auctioning spectrum
brings money into the public till; letting firms use it as they see fit
provides flexibility and an incentive to innovate; permitting resale puts it
into the hands of those who most want it. We might even consider placing an
annual tax on spectrum, to encourage conservation.
However, although
market-based approaches are desirable, they are only a first step, not the
finish line. More important than that reform is one that goes even farther, and
the benefits even greater: allowing a large amount of Òunlicensed spectrumÓ for
the free use of anyone -- a sort of Ònational parkÓ for wireless
communications. It will permit inexpensive, decentralised experimentation and
lead to innovation, which will benefit society -- and ultimately, even benefit
the companies using pricey, licensed spectrum.
The problem to overcome is
less technical than it is political. Today, regulation makes presumptions about
how wireless technology works that is unchanged from the days of Marconi, when
radios were comprised of coiled copper wires and crystals. Science has evolved,
but the rules have not. Modern radios are encoded in software; they have
microprocessors that make them smart devices. They can pluck out signals in the
airwaves, in the same way as the human ear can distinguish one conversation in
a crowded stadium, surrounded by the din of thousands of voices.
In the past, Òsmart radiosÓ
were not possible, so regulators handed out huge slices of spectrum so
broadcasters could SHOUT THEIR MESSAGE to reduce interference from other
signals. Today, the problem of interference, while still important, does not
have to be such a limiting factor. So the way we hand out spectrum should
change, only that it has not. One reason why is because of political factors:
existing license holders -- from radio and television broadcasters to
mobile-phone operators -- are loath to give up their valuable resource or see
the creation of possible competitors from Òfree spectrum.Ó
But it should be allowed. The
airwaves are a public resource. Government must ensure free spectrum just as it
ensures free speech. It will be a test of the integrity of our public officials
if they take the courageous step in establishing a Òspectrum commons.Ó
Always in regulatory policy,
a diversity of approaches is preferable. So we need to apply market principles
to spectrum allocation. But we also must create a Ònational parkÓ for spectrum.
We should do this on commercial grounds, to spark innovation, and on
public-interest grounds, to uphold democratic principles of allowing people the
free use of the airwaves that, after all, belong to them.
Conclusion:
These four myths might have
us reconsider our current telecoms regulation. Applied thoughtfully, it can
lead to new business models for industry, new services for consumers -- and I
hope, in deference to our hosts tonight, more work for lawyers!
If I began my remarks looking
at the past -- and delayed you from dinner by looking at the present -- let me
conclude with a few predictions about the future, looking out one, five and ten
years from now.
One year from now, in
2007.
Roaming charges will go down
throughout the EU without the need for legislation -- weÕll find that the
threat of regulation was enough for it to have the same effect.
ÒNetwork neutralityÓ will not
become law in the US or EU, but the openness of the Internet wonÕt be
jeopardised: market forces will find an acceptable solution for everyone.
However, in places where laws compel technology to conform to what legislators
and regulators believe is best -- such as FranceÕs rules mandating
compatibility with iPod and iTunes music -- unforeseen consequences will prove
problematic.
Five years from now,
2011.
Network connectivity will be
ubiquitous in the West and most cities in the developing world, mainly via
wireless. People will be online to such an extent that it will change the very
fabric of life. One of the biggest changes will come in the degree to which
ordinary people go from being consumers to producers of media, armed with
something as simple as a mobile phone. We got a taste of this on July 7, 2005
when individuals posted news and photos of the bombings. The BBC used the
material in its reports, and the London Metropolitan Police requested it for
its investigation. We are witnessing the emergence of citizen-journalism --
what I call ÒThe Fifth EstateÓ -- that will shake things up in both deeply
beneficial and profoundly terrible ways.
Moreover, objects that today
do not have processors will now have them, and be linked to a network, from
eyeglasses and shoes to medications. The great trend will be in Òcross-over
computingÓ -- objects that used to do only one thing now doing multiple things.
For example, wristwatches that also send biometric information to monitor our
health; doorknobs that fingerprint-authenticate us for entry; light bulb
sockets that also act as smoke-detectors. Notably, this is communications, but
non-human to non-human communications. It will eventually supercede
person-to-person communications, and mark a major new business opportunity for
operators and other sorts of companies.
Ten years from now, in
2016.
This is easiest to forecast.
I am certain that anything I or anyone else tries to predict will be wrong.
I say this with confidence
because if the preceding four myths of telecoms teaches us anything, it is that
we must approach the future with humility. The best we can hope for is that
regulation can ensure that there is a vibrant market -- and that a robust
market obviate the need for much regulation.
The point is this: the role
of regulation is not to predict the future but to let it happen.
Thank you
___________________________
About the speaker:
Kenneth Neil Cukier is the
technology and telecoms correspondent of The Economist. He was written extensively on global business,
technology and international affairs. Some of his work is available at:
www.cukier.com
© Copyright Kenneth Neil
Cukier 2006, under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 2.5 License.